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There is abundant empirical evidence showing that asymmetric price adjustments exist in a 
wide variety of markets. Prices tend to grow faster when costs rise relative to the rate at 
which prices drop when costs fall. The objective of this paper is to empirically test whether 
asymmetric price adjustments exist in a scenario where costs are increasing every period. 
The Colombian retail gasoline market offers an excellent case study due to a specific 
regulation, something discussed further in this paper. Our results suggest that when costs 
rise above the reference price –a government suggested retail price– retail prices tend to rise 
less relative to when costs grow below the reference price. Thus, asymmetry does exist. 
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AJUSTE ASIMÉTRICO DE PRECIOS BAJO COSTOS  
SIEMPRE CRECIENTES.  













La existencia de ajuste asimétrico de precios se ha demostrado empíricamente en una gran 
variedad de mercados. Un incremento en los costos lleva a un crecimiento de los precios 
más rápido que la correspondiente caída cuando los costos caen. El objetivo de este trabajo 
es demostrar empíricamente que, aún en un escenario de costos exclusivamente crecientes, 
existe ajuste asimétrico de precios. Para tal efecto se explotan las particularidades del 
mercado minorista de gasolina en Colombia. Los resultados sugieren que un incremento de 
costos por encima de un precio de referencia (sugerido por el gobierno a los minoristas) 
conlleva a que los precios de venta al público crezcan menos con respecto al caso en que 
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1.  Introduction 
The recent and abundant empirical literature concludes that asymmetric price adjustment is 
common to a wide variety of markets. The pattern found is that prices tend to grow faster when 
costs rise relative to the rate at which prices drop when costs fall. Peltzman (2000), working with 77 
consumer goods and 165 producer goods, finds evidence that asymmetric price adjustments do 
indeed exist in most markets. In a recent paper, Meyer et al. (2004) survey the literature, and note 
that such findings tend to be robust for the markets for agricultural products, interest rates and 
gasoline. Our paper focuses on the last one, the gasoline market.  
The literature documenting asymmetric price adjustments is quite abundant, and contrasts 
somewhat with the relatively scarce literature on the causes of such behavior. As Peltzman (2000) 
puts it, “the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory.” Borenstein et al. (1997) 
fill part of this gap by providing three explanations for this phenomenon—specifically, for the 
gasoline market.
1 (i) It might be that firms, given a negative cost shock, tend to keep prices high 
because they do not observe a change in demand. When these changes are detected, prices do fall. 
This would explain the slow downward reaction to cost reductions. (ii) Alternatively, given a 
(sudden and potential) excess of demand, the effect on prices is quickly transmitted due to the 
existence of limited inventories and production lags—that is, production is not able to adjust 
instantly, thus prices increase. On the contrary, given a (sudden and potential) excess of supply, 
prices do not fall as quickly due to the existence of production lags and finite inventories—that is, 
there is an expected though not current excess of available output that can satisfy the market. (iii) 
Finally, during periods of high volatility, consumers might search less when they observe a price 
change, as they assume it reflects a change in costs rather than a change in margins. This might 
allow retailers to pass along quickly any cost increase to prices while delaying the transmission of 
cost decreases.  
Recently, Lewis (2005) sophisticated the latter hypothesis by developing a theoretical reference 
price search model, which assumes that consumers’ price expectations are based on observed past 
prices. The idea is that a consumer will not search for alternative retailers if the observed current 
price is lower than the observed price for previous periods, due to the small probability of finding 
an even lower price. As a result, less consumers search, retailers face a (temporary) inelastic 
demand, and margins grow. This type of consumer behavior implies that when costs rise well above 
expectations, firms increase prices (though not margins) and consumers will begin searching. On 
the contrary, when costs fall, firms lower prices, but only enough to prevent consumers from 
searching. Note that the latter implies that when costs fall, margins rise.
2 
The Colombian gasoline market offers a unique scenario for testing issues related to this topic. 
As explained in detail throughout the paper, the market in Colombia has a peculiar structure. Every 
month, the government announces a suggested (though not mandatory) retail price for gasoline. 
This price is heavily advertised by the local media. In local jargon, the price is known as the 
“reference price for gasoline.” This reference price plays a crucial role in our story; we argue that 
consumers’ expectations about the retail prices for gasoline are anchored to this reference price, 
something that determines the adjustment speed of retail prices following cost changes.  
We take advantage of this market structure to test for an asymmetric price adjustment of a 
different sort than those commonly explored in the literature. We will not test whether cost 
                                                 
1 Balke et al. (1998) and Brown et al. (2000) discuss other plausible causes, such as asymmetric consumer response or 
accounting practices. 
2 Other recent search related models are discussed in Tappata (2006) and Yang and Ye (2008).   4
increases trigger a different reaction in prices relative to cost decreases.
3 In fact, the Colombian 
gasoline market has the particularity that wholesale gasoline prices—that is, costs—have followed 
an upward trend throughout our sample period, thus making it impossible to test for traditional 
asymmetric price adjustments. 
Our hypothesis is that when costs rise less than the reference price, we should observe fast price 
adjustments; conversely, slower adjustments should occur when costs increase more than the 
reference price. Why is this? Consider the former case—that is, costs rise less than the reference 
price. Under the plausible assumption that consumers do not observe costs, the retailer can quickly 
pass on the cost increment to retail prices. Consumers would find the retail price increment 
reasonable based on their expectations (as determined by the reference price). As a matter of fact, 
given that consumers might be willing to accept increments similar to those observed in the 
reference price, retailers face a temporary inelastic demand. This means we could even observe an 
overshooting of prices—that is, prices could increase more than costs. Conversely, if costs increase 
more than the reference price, the retailer could choose to delay passing on the increase. Hence, an 
asymmetry would arise.  
We find that when costs grow more than the reference price, retail prices tend to increase slower 
relative to when costs increase less than the reference price. In other words, we find asymmetric 
price adjustments of the kind we hypothesized above. In this sense, reference prices do indeed 
appear to anchor the expectations of consumers. A rise in costs below the reference price allows 
retailers to quickly pass it on to prices (as consumers find it natural to observe higher prices); 
alternatively, a rise in costs above the rise in the reference price forces retailers to delay price 
increases. In the latter case—much as represented in Borenstein et al. and Lewis’ stories—the 
behavior of retailers prevents consumers from searching for lower prices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the gasoline 
industry in Colombia. Section 3 describes the data used in the paper and takes a first broad look at 
it. Section 4 tests for price asymmetries, and section 5 presents several robustness tests. Section 6 
concludes. 
   
2.  Industry Structure and Pricing Policy 
Gasoline production in Colombia is a government-controlled monopoly. The Empresa 
Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol) controls the country’s two major refineries, which account for 
almost 100% of domestic fuel production. Competition is further restrained by the fact that 
Ecopetrol is also the main gasoline importer, as well as the owner of the infrastructure required to 
transport it across the country.  
Ecopetrol’s gasoline production is sold downstream to privately owned wholesalers—
multinational companies such as Chevron-Texaco and Exxon-Mobil, and domestic firms such as 
Terpel and Brio. These buyers pay Ecopetrol for the actual gasoline, as well as the right to use the 
infrastructure required to transport it. Once in their possession, wholesalers store the fuel in supply 
centers located throughout the country; from these centers, they are able to serve gas stations using 
transport services, generally provided by a third company.  
                                                 
3 Aside from those authors explicitly mentioned throughout this paper, others, such as Duffy-Deno (1996), Eckert 
(2002), and Godby (2000) have studied the gasoline market in search of asymmetric price adjustments. Only the latter, 
working for the Canadian retail gasoline market, was unable to find evidence of asymmetric pricing.    5
Gas stations, the third link in the chain, buy the gasoline from wholesalers and sell it to final 
consumers using one of the existing brands in the country.
4 Cerón (2001) notes that although these 
brands are proprietary to wholesalers, only a small percentage of gas stations are directly owned by 
them; most are operated by independent owners, who use the wholesalers brands through various 
contractual mechanisms.
5 Figure 1 describes the market. 
As inferred from the above discussion, the Colombian gasoline market is highly regulated over 
all of the various stages involved. Prior to 1999, when the government established a new regime for 
fuel prices in local markets, prices were set on a yearly (or sometimes shorter) basis, and adjusted 
by the inflation rate or other macroeconomic variables. In 1999, with the objective of inducing 
competition in both production and distribution, a new pricing policy was implemented. This new 
policy continued to regulate refiner and wholesale prices, but allowed retail gas stations in the major 
cities to set prices freely.
6 This policy, which tried to mirror the conditions faced by a hypothetical 
importer, determined that the price at the refinery—which is paid by wholesalers to Ecopetrol—
should follow the international Mexican Gulf Coast price for gasoline, which is adjusted based on  
import costs.  
The second stage, which entails the prices that wholesalers charge gas stations, is also regulated. 
More specifically, there is a maximum regulated margin, whereby wholesalers are allowed to sell at 
a price equal to or lower than the regulated one. In small cities, the third stage, which entails the 
price charged by gas stations—is also regulated. Nevertheless, in our paper, we focus on the data 
from major cities, where gas stations are free to set their own price.  
In major cities, the only role the government plays with respect to retail prices is to establish a 
suggested (that is, reference) price. Published at the beginning of each month, the reference price—
which is city specific—is not mandatory, and.retailers may price above or below it. To be sure, the 
reference price is not a market price, but rather a suggested price which, according to the 
government, accounts for all costs in the production and distribution chain while allowing for 
retailers to make a reasonable profit. Specifically, this price accounts for producers’ revenues, the 















                                                 
4 Current regulation forbids gas stations from buying gasoline directly from the refiner—that is, the wholesaler’s 
channel must be used. 
5 Recently, new competitors have entered the retail market. For example, in 2006, the Brazilian multinational 
corporation Petrobras acquired all of Shell’s gas stations; it is currently trying to push up its market share against 
competitors like Exxon-Mobil,  Chevron-Texaco and the Colombian firm Terpel, the top three brands in the retail 
market. 
6 According to Gonzales (2004), major cities account for 60-70% of total gasoline consumption in Colombia.   6
 






















Source: The authors. 
 
In 1999, shortly after this new pricing policy came into force, the government realized that 
matching domestic and international prices at the beginning of the production chain was not 
sustainable. The policy was implemented during a period when world oil prices were low, but a few 
months later, international oil and gasoline prices began to rise. The effect on domestic prices was 
immediate, fast and unexpected by the government, which decided to control the pace of the 
adjustment and match the international price only gradually.
7 Today, this gradual adjustment 
towards international prices is still under way.  
 
3.  Data: Sources, Description and Evolution 
We use two set of prices in this paper, retail and wholesale. The information on retail prices 
originated in a monthly survey carried out by Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética (UPME), a 
government agency that is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Mining and Energy. The survey collects 
retail gasoline prices during the first week of each month, directly from gas stations in ten major 
cities. Data on wholesale prices comes from our own calculations, based on the price regulations 
and monthly updates published by the Ministry of Mining and Energy for each of the 10 cities 
included in the gasoline retail price survey mentioned above. These prices vary by city, mainly due 
to transportation costs.
8 
                                                 
7 In addition to this, a new technical modification to the regulation on prices was recently introduced. As a measure 
aimed at reducing the contamination produced by CO2 emissions, it is now mandatory to mix regular gasoline with a 
10% content of ethanol fuel. Although the mixture of regular and ethanol fuel slightly modifies the calculations used by 
the government in establishing the monthly regulated price, the resulting prices have barely changed. During our sample 
period, which runs through December 2006, this new regulation was applied in only three cities (Bogota, Cali, and 
Pereira), but is expected to be applied/enacted in more cities in the near future. This new regime became operative in 
Cali and Pereira in November 2005. In Bogotá, it did not start operating until February 2006. 
8 Costs may also vary due to certain local taxes, as well as the existence of ethanol fuel in the cases of Bogotá, Cali and 









(Supply Centres)  CONSUMERS 
Gas stations are owned by 
wholesalers or by 
independent owners using 









(Major cities only)  7
Despite the fact that we have information on regular and premium gasoline, we only consider the 
former, because consumption of the latter is relatively limited in Colombia.
9 For example, as 
reported by Ecopetrol, in 2005, regular gasoline sales (in gallons) accounted for 93% of total 
gasoline sales in the country.   
Data on retail prices is available for 39 months, starting in July 2003 and running through 
December 2006.
10 It consists of an unbalanced panel of prices, as charged by over 200 gas stations 
in ten major cities. The methodology used to survey gas stations changed in mid-2004. Given the 
resulting compatibility problem, the data actually used in the econometric estimations runs from 
July 2004 through December 2006.  
 The econometric analysis below excludes all stations with less than five observations, leaving us 
with a sample that, on average, consists of 173.4 stations per month over the 30 month period of 
analysis. As shown in Figure 2, in major cities such as Bogotá, Cali and Medellin, a greater number 
of stations are surveyed relative to smaller cities like Neiva, Santa Marta and Valledupar. The ten 
cities surveyed not only account for 32.8 % of total gasoline sales in Colombia, but also represent 
34.7% of the country’s overall population according to the latest population census.  
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As mentioned above, not all of the 212 gas stations being sampled register observations every 
single month.
11 Figure 3 shows how the data is distributed in more detail. For example, 154 






                                                 
9 Regular gasoline has a minimum of 81 octanes, while premium has a minimum of 87 octanes. 
10 Three months are missing in the original data—August 2003, December 2003, and June 2004.  
11 According to the Colombian Association of Gasoline Retailers (Fendipetróleo), the estimated number of gas stations 
in Colombia in 2004 was 2341; thus, the 212 gas stations used in our sample represent 7.7% of the total stations in the 
country.   8
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As Figure 4 shows, during our sample period, retail and wholesale prices exhibit a clear upward 
trend. Both retail average prices and wholesale prices in each of the 10 cities have grown steadily 
since July 2004, at monthly average rates slightly greater than 1%. While retail prices have 
grown—on average, 35.9% between the first and the last month of our sample—city wholesale 
prices have grown during the same time span by 33.4%. On average, higher retail prices have been 
spotted in Pereira and Cali, while lower prices have been found in Valledupar and Pasto.
12 Although 
prices are lower in these two border cities, the monthly average growth rate of their retail prices is 
greater than the national average. 
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Despite the similar growing trends of costs and prices, price-cost margins—measured as the 
difference between retail prices without taxes and wholesale prices (as a percentage of price)—have 
been falling in most cities, with the exception of small ones, like Pasto and Santa Marta.
13 As 
Figure 4 shows, in larger cities like Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cali, price-cost margins are 
shrinking faster. 
 
4.  Asymmetric Price Adjustments  
As mentioned above, the asymmetry we expect to find is conceptually different than traditional 
price asymmetries. We exploit the fact that in Colombia the suggested retail reference price of 
gasoline is publicly available and heavily advertised every month. Our hypothesis is that 
consumers’ expectations about the retail price of gasoline are anchored to the reference price, and 
that this determines the adjustment speed of retail prices following a cost change.  
What kind of an asymmetry would arise then? Under the plausible assumption that consumers do 
not observe costs, a rise in costs less than the increment of the reference price would allow retailers 
to quickly transfer the cost increase to prices. In such a situation, consumers would find the retail 
price increment reasonable based on their expectations. Conversely, if costs increase more than the 
reference price, retailers will have an incentive to not pass the whole cost increase on to consumers, 
or at least to delay the increase. Hence, an asymmetry would arise.  
When referring to asymmetric price adjustments, then, we have in mind large vis-à-vis small 
increments in the cost (relative to the reference price) rather than positive or negative cost changes. 
A large change (lc) in cost occurs when wholesale prices increase more than the reference price. 
Similarly, a small change (sc) in cost refers to when the increment in the wholesale price is less than 
that for the reference price. This is defined on a per month and per city basis.
14 Note that, by 
definition, the reference price level is higher than the wholesale price. Therefore, we do not want to 
compare the level of costs relative to the reference price, as the latter is always higher.  
                                                 
13 Here, taxes refer to the 25% tax charged on the retail price of regular gasoline. 
14 Recall that both reference prices and wholesale (regulated) prices are city specific. 
 
Figure 4. Wholesale and Retail Prices   10
Table 1 shows that the definition described above yields an evenly split sample between large 
and small changes in cost.  
 
Table 1. The number of months with large and small cost changes per gasoline station. 
 
# Months  ∆SmallC  ∆LargeC  ∆TOTALC 
Small/Large  139 140 
%  49.8% 50.2% 
279 
    Source: UPME, own calculations. 
 
Before attempting an econometric estimation of potential price asymmetries, we should first check a 
simple corollary of the hypothesis, one easily testable in our dataset. Our hypothesis states that large 
cost changes should be accompanied by a slow reaction of prices, while small cost changes should 
imply a fast price adjustment. As a consequence, large cost changes should go hand in hand with 
temporary low margins, while small cost changes should coincide with higher margins.  
Table 2 reports simple averages of margins, calculated as the difference between retail and 
wholesale prices, excluding the taxes paid by retailers. This margin is presented as a percentage of 
the wholesale prices. The results go in the expected direction and the differences are statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 2. Mean Margin Averages for Small and Large Cost Changes 
Margins (%)  ∆SmallC*  ∆LargeC*  ∆TOTALC 
Mean  10,90% 10,70% 10,80% 
N  2411 2712 5123 
           * The mean averages are statistically different (p-value = 0.02). 
       Source: UPME. own calculations 
 
There are several econometrical approaches to the problem of estimating asymmetric price 
adjustments. Meyer et al. (2004) discuss what they call the pre-cointegration approach and the 
cointegration approach. The basic strategy of the former is to divide input prices into increasing and 
decreasing phases, by interacting them with the appropriate dummy variables. The cointegration 
approach, on the other hand, after establishing the long-run relationship between prices and costs, 
estimates error correction models for tracking price adjustments to (negative and positive) cost 
shocks. This is the approach followed by Borenstein et al. (1997), and Lewis (2005). 
Borenstein et al. (1997) estimate an error correction model wherein, using a one stage approach, 
the change in retail prices is explained by the change in costs and a lagged error correction term. 
Lewis (2005), on the other hand, enhances the technique by using a two step approach, one that 
explicitly estimates the error correction term in the first stage. In this paper, we adopt the two stage 
approach.  
Equation 1, which corresponds to the first stage of our empirical model, pools the data by city, 
and estimates the first step of the error correction model, wherein it is theoretically expected that, 
over the long run, prices and costs should be related.
15 In particular, we estimate that  
                                                 
15 The first stage requires that both retail and wholesale prices be non-stationary, in order to test for cointegration. In the 




t c t s t EST C P , 2
212
1
, 1 , ) ( η φ φ + + + = ∑
=
  ,           (1) 
 
where t s P ,  stands for the retail price at station s for month t and  t c C ,  represents the wholesale 
price in city c during period t.
16 The equation also includes a time trend (t). Station fixed effects 
(EST) are also included to capture the time invariant characteristics of gas stations, such as location 
and brand.
17 The estimates for Equation 1 generate the error correction term ( 1 , − t s η ), which is used 
during the second stage of the model. The Equation 1 estimates are reported in Table 3. 
 




1 φ   C     0.712***  (0.012) 
2 φ   t    21.608***  (0.425) 
N  5202   
Stations  212   
R-squared  0.98  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         Source: UPME, own calculations. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that our estimate of  1 φ  is relatively close to that obtained by 
Borenstein et al. (1997), who used a one step approach. Lewis (2005), however, fails to obtain a 
reasonable value for  1 φ ; moreover, based on a theoretical discussion, he decides to exogenously set 
it equal to one before proceedings to the second stage of the estimation.
 In the results reported in our 
robustness section, we also follow Lewis’ approach—that is, we exogenously set   1 φ  = 1 during the 
first stage. We find that our main conclusions remain essentially unaltered.  
 Equation 2 corresponds to the second stage of the error correction model. In particular, we 
estimate that 
 






























− ∑ ∑  .  (2)   
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
between wholesale and average retail prices, we find that there is cointegration at a 5% level in about half of the sample. 
Given the very short time span covered in our sample (something which makes the identification of cointegration 
difficult), we interpret the results as indicative of a long-run relationship between costs and prices, as our/the theory 
predicts. The cointegration tests were run using the monthly sample starting in July 2003 and ending in December 2006. 
The results are not reported here.  
16 Recall that wholesale prices are available only at the city level, whereas retail prices vary across stations. Therefore, 
no city fixed effects are included. 
17 It is true that stations might change brands at some point in time. However, in this case, it is an advantage to use a 
sample with a short period of time, as the assumption that brand and other specific gas station characteristics do not 
change then becomes more plausible.   12
The change in prices depends on lagged prices and cost changes, separated according to the 
relative size of the cost changes, as discussed above—that is, both the contemporary and lagged 
cost changes, as well as the lagged prices are split based on the large/small cost definition discussed 
above. Two lags in costs and two lags in prices are included. In the robustness section, we explore 
whether or not the results are sensible to the inclusion of additional lags; again we find that the main 
conclusions remain unaltered.  
The equation also includes the error correction term estimated in equation 1. In order to further 
allow for an asymmetric adjustment,  1 , − t s η  is allowed to affect price changes in different ways, 
depending on whether the costs are large or small (
sc lc
t s t s 1 , 1 , ,
− − η η ). This distinction makes the 
asymmetrical adjustment of prices explicit, and allows for differences in the speed at which prices 
reach their long-run relationship with costs. We again later verify in the robustness section the 
impact of allowing only a single error correction term. As explained later, our conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
A natural concern when estimating equation 2 is the possible endogeneity arising from retail 
prices looping back into wholesale prices. Fortunately, this endogeneity is not present in the 
Colombian case, inasmuch as wholesale prices are exogenously set on a monthly basis by the 
government using a publicly available formula, such that retail prices do not affect them in any way. 
The main rationale in the formula for setting wholesale prices is to establish a slow convergence 
towards international oil prices and, thus, slowly cut oil subsidies. Retail prices and internal demand 
conditions are not part of the formula in any implicit or explicit way.  
The estimated coefficients of equation 2, crucial inasmuch as they are the necessary inputs for 
obtaining the impulse response functions of prices following cost shocks, are displayed in Table 4. 
 




γ1lc  ∆lcP-1 -0.12701***  (0.01957) 
γ2lc  ∆lcP-2 0.06319***  (0.01942) 
γ1sc  ∆scP-1 -0.10343***  (0.02274) 
γ2sc  ∆scP-2 -0.07242***  (0.02222) 
β0lc  ∆lcC  0.87698***  (0.01822) 
β1lc  ∆lcC-1 0.25995***  (0.02739) 
β2lc  ∆lcC-2 0.06897***  (0.02630) 
β0sc  ∆scC  1.26045***  (0.05066) 
β1sc  ∆scC-1 0.35496***  (0.06444) 
β2sc  ∆scC-2 0.44775***  (0.05828) 
θlc  η-1lc  -0.20849***  (0.01392) 
θsc  η-1sc  -0.22293***  (0.01565) 
N  4544   
Stations  212   
R-squared 0.75904   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: UPME, own calculations. 
Following Borenstein et al. (1997), we depict cumulative impulse-response functions, tracking 
the adjustment path of prices given a one unit change in costs. The model allows for different short-  13
run reactions on the part of retail prices, depending on whether the cost shock was large or small 
relative to the reference price. Of course, being cumulative, the impulse-response functions 
converge to the long-run price-cost pass-trough. The complete adjustment process is illustrated in 
Figure 5. The plot includes 95% confidence intervals, calculated using a bootstrap method, to verify 
the statistical relevance of the (asymmetrical) adjustments. 
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An asymmetrical adjustment of the kind we hypothesize is recognizable in Figure 5. The results 
suggest that if costs rise above the increment in the reference price, retail prices will adjust to a 
lesser extent than when the opposite is true. If costs rise by 1 Colombian peso (COP$), and 
assuming a reference price increment above one, retail prices will increase by COP$1.26 a month 
later. Conversely, assuming a reference price increment below COP$1, a COP$1 increase in costs 
implies that, a month later, prices will rise by only COP$0.87.  
An interesting finding is the overshooting of retail prices when cost increases are small (relative 
to changes in the reference price). This result suggests that, very early in the process, retail prices 
increase by more than the expected long-run adjustment. Later on, the price adjusts to the long-run 
pass–through. Based on Borenstein et al. (1997), this finding could be the result of a lack of 
competition. If this is the case, every increase in costs will immediately be transferred to retail 
prices, more than proportionally. Additionally,due to a lack of competition (and assuming a 
relatively inelastic demand), total demand will not significantly decrease. Another plausible 
explanation related to our hypothesis, is that consumers, unaware of the actual cost increase, find 
large price increases palatable as long as they are coherent with their expectations, formed on the 
basis of the reference price. In other words, if the reference price increases more than costs, retailers 
are able to increase their margins over the short run. Hence, overshooting arises. 
To sum up, our results suggest that asymmetric pricing is a fact in the Colombian gasoline 
market. In our story, asymmetric pricing arises because of the role played by the widely available 
monthly reference price—consumers form their expectations based on the reference price. Based on 
these expectations, consumers decide whether to search or not for better retail prices, and retailers 
will behave as described in Figure 5. However, note that the existence of a reference price is not a 
necessary condition for asymmetric pricing to arise in ever-increasing market environment. Cabral 
and Fishman (2006), for example, argue that, assuming a price increase, consumers will not search 
for a better price if they perceive it to be moderate. If, on the contrary, consumers perceive the   14
increase in retail prices to be overly high, they will have an incentive to search. The question now 
is, how can one define empirically what large and small price increases are? The Colombian market 
offers us a perfect answer—the monthly and widely publicized reference price. In our case, 
therefore, we are able to sustain that asymmetric pricing is in large part promoted by the existence 
of this reference price. 
 
5.  Robustness tests 
This section tests the robustness of our results in face of alternative empirical specifications. In 
particular, we report the results with the following changes relative to the baseline model: (i) we 
estimate the impulse response functions allowing for a single error correction term, as opposed to 
separating its impact according to the relative size of the cost changes; (ii) we report the results with 
four instead of two lags; and (iii) we report the impulse response functions following Lewis’ 
strategy of setting  1 φ  = 1, rather than using the estimate from the first stage of the model. 
(i) Single Error correction term: In Figure 6, we depict the impulse response function using the 
estimates from Equation 2, where a single error correction term is used. If, compared with Figure 5, 
one concludes that the main result is virtually unaltered, i.e. large cost increases relative to reference 
price increases force retailers to delay price adjustments. On the other hand, small cost changes 
allow for a quick pass–through, with the same overshooting characteristics discussed earlier. 
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(ii) Lag structure: The second stage of our baseline model is estimated using using two lags for 
price and cost changes.
18 We check the robustness of our choice by replicating the exercise with 
alternative lag structures. For example, Figure 7 replicates the exercise using four lags. We find that 
the main results remain unaltered. In the results not reported, we tried other lag structures and found 
similar results. We conclude that our results are robust for the lag structure used in equation 2. 
 
Figure 7. The Cumulative Impulse Response Function: Large/Small Cost Changes. 
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(iii)  1 1 = φ : The baseline model follows a two stage approach, wherein the first stage estimates 
the long-run coefficient linking prices and costs. The value reported in Table 3 is  71 . 0 1 = φ . 
Nevertheless, as extensively discussed by Lewis, the theory suggests that  1 φ  should be 1. It is 
conceivable that the coefficient we obtained is different from the one suggested by the theory 
simply because we use a short time-series dimension in our sample. Therefore, we re-estimate the 
impulse response function exogenously, setting 1 1 = φ . We report the results in Figure 8. 
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As expected, a distinguishable difference in the baseline results is that, over the long run, an 
increase in costs of COP$ 1 raises prices by the same amount. This is naturally the consequence of 
having exogenously set the long-run pass-through as equal to 1. Other than that, all the patterns 
uncovered and discussed in the baseline scenario remain robust.  
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this paper was to determine whether asymmetric pricing exists in a case where 
costs never fall. In order to test this hypothesis, we used data from the Colombian gasoline market 
where wholesale gasoline prices have consistently increased month by month over the course of our 
sample period. We exploit the existence of a widely publicized reference price to determine that, 
even in such a case, asymmetric pricing does exist.  
The existence of asymmetric pricing is based on the manner in which consumers’ expectations 
are formed. The reference price—a government suggested (that is, one that is not mandatory) retail 
price for gasoline—seems to play a key role in determining whether retailers adjust prices quickly 
or slowly following a cost increase. We show that when the reference price rises more to a greater 
extent than costs, retailers are able to quickly pass-through the cost increase to prices. Conversely, if 
costs rise more to a greater extent than the reference price, retailers delay the pass-through.  
Our empirical strategy, though able to identify the described price asymmetry, is not designed to 
uncover the causes of this asymmetry. Nevertheless, the literature suggests several potential 
explanations for price asymmetries. Some of these are consistent with our results and the structure 
of the gasoline market in Colombia; others not.  
One explanation for asymmetric pricing, suggested by Borenstein et al. (1997), represents a 
variation of Green and Porter’s (1984) trigger price story. In that model, firms, when in equilibrium, 
restrict output to a level below the competitive equilibrium. The price is adjusted—that is, a price 
war begins—when sales fall below the threshold level. However, the trigger price story requires 
negative demand shocks and price cycles which were not observed during our sample period.  
 Similarly, the inventory argument explaining price asymmetries—that is, that sudden positive 
demand shocks quickly raise prices due to limited inventories and production lags, while sudden 
positive supply shocks usually imply future but not present lower prices (again due to production 
lags and finite inventories)—is based on the presence of unexpected demand or supply shocks. As 
mentioned in the previous case, we do not observe any sharp changes in demand over the course of 
our sample period. Analogously, a review of the historical record suggests that no sudden supply 
shocks were observed during our sample period. Thus, the inventory argument does not appear to 
provide a plausible explanation for the price asymmetries we identified. 
Eckert (2002) argues that price asymmetries might be explained using Maskin and Tirole’s 
(1988) alternating-move price setting duopoly model. This model predicts a price-cycle 
equilibrium, with retail prices being determined by two alternating regimes. The idea is that a price 
war is established in the undercutting regime up until the point where it is profitable for a firm to 
raise prices above the monopoly level. At that point, another undercutting regime starts. In the case 
studied in our paper, however, no price cycles were observed, even if defined broadly—that is, 
relative to the reference price.  
In our view, our results are compatible with at least two theories. Firstly, they are consistent with 
Rotemberg’s (2005) state dependent model, wherein firms choose the timing for adjusting prices so 
that it corresponds with those times when consumers find price changes most palatable; in our case, 
a large increase in the reference price (relative to costs) is the signal that a change would be 
palatable, and thus triggers more rapid price adjustments.  
Secondly, our results seem to best fit the search story sketched by Borenstein et al. (1997), and 
further developed by Lewis (2005), Yang and Ye (2008) and Cabral and Fishman (2006). 
Consumers are potential seekers of better prices, and firms acknowledge this.  The existence of   17
reference prices shape consumers’ expectations and determines how quickly cost increases can be 
passed on to final prices. When costs increase to a greater extent than the reference price, retailers 
postpone the full adjustment of retail prices to avoid having consumers search out better prices. If 
no reference price existed, consumers would not necessarily be aware of the relative importance of 
price increments; hence asymmetric pricing, if present in the data, requires further explanation.  
The main conclusion is that, under ever-increasing costs, asymmetric pricing does exist. Further 
research should expand our investigation to test whether in markets with similar characteristics—for 
instance, markets with widely publicized “suggested prices”—price adjustments following cost 
changes exhibit asymmetries as the ones we identified. If so, the existence of asymmetric pricing in 
a market with ever-increasing costs warrants additional theoretical work in order to enhance our 
understanding of the causes of such behavior. 
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